Japan – Page 73 – Mutantfrog Travelogue

How do free manga make money in a declining manga market?

Since my last translation of something about the anime industry was something of a hit, I thought I’d do a little pandering and take a look at an emerging free manga in Japan as reported by Weekly Oriental Economy:

Free manga magazines: How exactly do they make money?

(2007/01/31)
People are abuzz about the free weekly manga (comic book) that is being handed out around Tokyo. The person behind it all let us know his business model (printed in Weekly Oriental Economy’s Feb. 3, 2007 edition)

The first free manga magazine in Japan, Comic Gumbo, has been released in Tokyo. Just recently, a “free paper” market has sprung up upon the success of Recruit Co.’s “R25” and “Hot Pepper” (see some of the contents of R25 at neomarxisme). In response, this manga magazine has pounded its way in.

The printer is Digima, a venture publishing firm. Company president Akihiko Kai (age 36) founded the company in Sept. 2005 after serving as an operating officer at Dentsu (Japan’s top ad agency) and Trans Cosmos (marketing/offshoring). Gumbo’s target audience is salarymen aged 20-40, and every Tuesday and Wednesday 100,000 copies are handed out at areas including major stations on JR’s Yamanote Line.

The size of Japan’s comic book market is approx. 500 billion yen (about US$4.1 billion, in annual sales I’m assuming). However, readers, who are mostly young people, have been stolen away by mobile phones and the Internet, setting the market on a downward trend. Kai explains: “To get into the market as a latecomer we needed to be bold by making our product free.”

What’s surprising is the fullness of content in the pages that wouldn’t make you think it’s free. The inaugural issue for Jan. 16-17 contained 12 series and was 230 pages long. There is also an impressive lineup of writers, including Tatsuya Egawa, author of Tokyo University Story (he’s doing a manga version of Botchan [English translation of the original novel at No-Sword]). The manuscript payments made to regular contributors are reportedly in line with other manga magazines.

Aggressive use of the Internet

So, can this be profitable? The company has not released its revenue plans, but there are only 26 pages of ads, constituting 10% of the entire book. This is far fewer than R25, which is 40% ads, indicating that they are not relying on ad revenue.

Actually, Digima allows readers to access past series on the Internet for a monthly fee of 500 yen. If membership grows healthily, then this by itself will serve as a major revenue source. In addition, the company intends to issue a trade paperback in the first half of this year. These two are what Kai envisions as the main revenue streams for his company.

The reason that Gumbo has included 12 series is simple. The more series there are, the more likely it is that one will become a hit. If a hit emerges, the trade paperback edition will become a long seller, allowing for healthy returns.

Free distribution is simply a method to lower the hurdles for entry into the market. The subsequent non-free businesses will be the main focus, making this fundamentally different from the free newspapers. The inaugural issue immediately “sold out” its 100,000 copies, succeeding in finding their way into readers’ hands. Will it be able to earn loyal fans? Gumbo’s true battle will be from here on out.

(Writer: Akihiko Fujio; Photo: Koichi Imai)

Comment: I don’t know about paying 500 yen/month just to read manga unless there were a series I was really into (or if I were into scanlations), but hey it sounds like a good enough model if the quality actually is high enough to result in hit paperbacks and TV/movie licenses.

A Chinese perspective on Kokaryo

A few days ago I wrote about Kokaryo, a decrepit student dormitory in Kyoto which is the center of a 40 year long legal battle between China (People’s Republic of China) and Taiwan (Republic of China). Here is a translation of an article produced by the Chinese state owned press. I first found a Chinese language version of this piece here, on the China Central Television (CCTV) web site, under the section on “Problems in China/Japan Relations” in a special celebrating 30 years of normalized relations between China and Japan. Later on I found a Japanese translation of the very same text on an official Chinese Consulate web page, verifying that it does in fact represent the government stance. Here is a translation of that article.

Problems in Sino-Japanese Relations

(7) Kokaryo

Kokaryo is in Kyoto City, Japan, and is a student dormitory that at first Kyoto University rented for the use of Chinese students during World War II. The building has five floors above ground, one below ground, and an area of 2130 square meters. In May of 1950, the representative body of the Taiwanese authorities in Japan sold off assets that had been seized from the Japanese army that had invaded China, and used those government funds to purchase the building. In December of 1952, the Taiwanese “Ambassador to Japan” [Ed: take note if the use of quotations] entered into a sales contract with the former owner of the building, and in June of 1961 registered the property under the name of “Republic of China.” In June of 1961 Chen Zhi-mai, Taiwan’s “Ambassador to Japan” filed a lawsuit at the Kyoto District Court with the patriotic overseas Chinese as the defendants, requesting their eviction from the Kokaryo. However, patriotic overseas Chinese and foreign students of our country had consistently been managing and living in the property since Japan lost the war, and there had been no participation from Taiwan in this. After the normalization of Sino-Japanese relations, the Chinese Embassy in Japan and the Chinese Consulate in Osaka had continually been fiscally supervising and guiding the Kokaryo. The Chinese government made special payments, made repairs to Kokaryo, and used it as a dormitory for study abroad students from our country.

In September 1977, the Kyoto district court rejected the plaintif’s complaint and recognized that, based on the normalization of Sino-Japanese relations, the property rights of Kokaryo belonged to the People’s Republic of China, but on the other hand, pronounced that the plaintiff did have the right to litigate as an interested party. In October of the same year, Taiwanese authorities filed an appeal in the Osaka Supreme Court under the name of “Republic of China.” In April of 1982, the Osaka Supreme Court accepted the appeal of the “Republic of China” as “the confirmed de-facto government” of Taiwan and overturned the verdict of the Kyoto District Court. In February of 1986 the Kyoto District Court, quoting the main argument of the Osaka Supreme Court, found against the patriotic-for-China overseas Chinese. In February of 1987, the Osaka Supreme Court decided a second trial upholding the verdict of the original trial. In response, the overseas Chinese appealed to the Japan Supreme Court in March of 1987.

From 1974 until now, China has made several appeals to Japan, stressing the following. Kokaryo is a national asset of China, and China has sought the cooperation of Japan in rectifying the name under which Kokaryo is registered, as the property rights of Kokaryo should have belonged to the People’s Republic of China since the normalization of Sino-Japanese relations. The Kokaryo issue is not an ordinary civil suit. It is an issue related to the legal interests of the Chinese government, and a case related to the basic principles of relations between Japan and China. The substance of this problem is the very public creation of “two China’s” in a formal Judicial manner, and violates the Joint Communiqué of the Government of Japan and the Government of the People’s Republic of China and Treaty of Peace and Friendship between Japan and the People’s Republic of China, and shatters the understanding that relationed between Japan and Taiwan shall be limited to private and regional channels. The verdict of the Osaka Supreme Court is not only politically mistaken, but is also of no use legally, violated the fundamentals and principles of international law with a number of problems such as the distinction between national succession, governmental succession and government recognized legal validity and the nature of property, and also does not accord with the Japanese constitution. At present, this case is still in progress at the Japanese Supreme Court. China is watching with great interest.

Globalized Donuts

Regular readers of the blog will remember Adamu’s saliva-speckled posts on Krispy Kreme donuts. Well, I’ve just found out via Michael Turton’s blog that Dunkin Donuts recently announced plans to expand into Taiwan, and then eventually through them into China. As far as I know, this will make Taiwan the second country after the Philippines to have both a Dunkin Donuts and a Mister Donut franchise, a condition that if you know the history of both companies suggests an incongruity of much the same character as the fact that light is both a wave and a particle.

Before coming to Japan I had never heard of Mr Donut, and was a bit incredulous when I was first told that it was originally an American company. Noticing that their advertising makes notes of the fact that it was started in San Francisco Chinatown (some locations have Chinese-y menu items like dumplings or noodles to play off of this), I assumed that it was just one of those American chains which, despite being fairly big regionally, had just never made it from one coast to the other. Except for wishing, whenever I passed a Mr Donut in Japan, that it was a Dunkin’ Donuts instead, I never thought of them again until I moved to Taiwan to study Chinese in 2004.

I arrived in Taipei in May, apparently no more than a couple of months after the introduction of Mr Donut to Taiwan. Unlike in Japan, where it was nothing but a common vendor of sweet and sometimes sticky pastries, Mr Donuts in Taiwan was a phenomenon, with desperate young consumers waiting on lines so snakishly long that they were later to be my frame of reference when my rarely present nominal flatmate Dmitri described to me the experience of waiting in line to get into that first Pushkin Square McDonalds to open in Russia after perestroika.

Having been impressed by the utter ordinariness of Mr Donuts product in Japan, I was rather shocked by the amount of enthusiasm there was for the product here, until I noticed the promotion campaign. To see what the centerpiece of that campaign is, just visit out the Mr Donut Taiwan web site and check out the title:

Mister Donut Japan No.1 Donut Shop

While in Japan the brand image of Mr Donut is based around its American-ness, with a minor strain of Chinese-ness from the San Francisco heritage, Mister Donut Taiwan is being promoted entirely on the basis of its popularity in Japan. While Taiwan certainly has nothing against American products or fast food, the Japanese link has a much stronger association with the high class. For one illustrative example of how the Japanese image is helpful for marketing in Taiwan, notice how dry cleaning stores are always labeled as “Japanese style dry cleaning,” despite (to my knowledge at least) there being any particular historic link between Japan and dry cleaning. We can also see an interesting choice in the removal of any marketing or products associated with Chinatown. After all, why would the idea of third-rate Japanified Americanized Dim-sum be remotely appealing in a city where you can find the same type of thing at lower prices and higher quality in almost any direction you turn?

If you look at the order and location in which stores were opened in Taipei, you can see a clear attempt by the planners of Mr Donut Taiwan to instill establish Mr Donut as a high class brand.
(1) Tianmu – a high class neighborhood with many expensive stores.
(2) Breeze Center – A department store. I don’t know if it’s Japanese owned, but it has a strongly Japanese style to it, and even contains the Taipei branch of Japanese bookstore Kinokuniya.
(3) New York, New York – High end shopping center located at the base of Taipei 101, currently the tallest skyscraper in the world.
(4) Taipei Station – Not actual in the station, but in the underground shopping center, right by the door connecting it with the neighboring Shin-Kong Mitsukoshi Department Store.
After this they began branching out into somewhat less stylish areas, and now have a total of 17 stores including one in Xinzhu and three in Gaoxiong, but by associating the early stores both with high class shopping districts and Japan, the company did an excellent job of beginning to establish their brand as something more more at the level of Starbucks than McDonalds.

By now you may be thinking, but didn’t this start with Dunkin’ Donuts, not Mr Donuts? Well, let’s look briefly of the history of these two brands.

Mister Donut was founded by Harry Winokur in 1956 and had locations across most of North America.

Mister Donut was the largest competitor to Dunkin’ Donuts, which was founded by Harry Winokur’s brother-in-law William Rosenberg in 1950, prior to being acquired by Dunkin’ Donuts’ parent company, Allied-Lyons, in February 1990.

After the acquisition of Mister Donut by Allied-Lyons, all Mister Donut locations within North America were offered the chance to change their name to Dunkin’ Donuts. Now only a scattered few locations still hold the name Mister Donut.

In 1983, Duskin Co. Ltd of Japan acquired the rights to franchise Mister Donut throughout Japan and Asia. Mister Donut is the largest donut chain operating in Japan.

[From Wikipedia]
For some reason there remain sixteen Mr Dont locations in the United States that have not transitioned to the Dunkin’ Donuts brand, but for all intents and purposes they are now a Japanese company, under the aegis of Duskin Co. Ltd., and the Mr Donut brand has spread to the Philippines, and now Taiwan, as an offshoot of the Japanese company. There was a Dunkin Donuts operation in Japan for a time, run as a joint venture with D&C, the holding company of the internationally famous Yoshinoya brand, but currently the only East Asian country with Dunkin Donuts is South Korea, although it is quite common in Thailand, and in the Philippines one can even find Dunkin Donuts right next door to Mr Donut. Will we ever see such a site in Taiwan? Will Dunkin’ Donuts take hold? Will we ever see Krispy Kreme opening in a vacated Mr Donuts shop next to Taipei 101?

For a good taste of Taiwan’s Mr Donut hysteria, circa February 2005, check out this Taipei Times article. For a taste of how they may fare in the future, check out this man on the street interview from the very same article.

“It’s the best donut you can get in Taiwan, but it’s not as good as Dunkin Donuts,” Fu told the Taipei Times. “If someone bought some for me, I’d eat it,” he said, but indicated that he would not buy the doughnut again for himself.

Harry Potter

Today’s announcement of the sale date of the final Harry Potter novel (July 21) offers an opportune moment to mention one of my favorite language related web sites, CJVlang.com. CJVlang is short for Chinese Japanese and Vietnamese Language, and contains a number of fascinating comparisons between the way words are used in Chinese and
how they are used in Japanese and Vietnamese, two of the three languages whose vocabularies are roughly half derived from Chinese loan words. (Unfortunately there is no material on Korean.)
As the site creator says:

It will take you on a trip through the familiar and the exotic — the way Harry Potter has been translated into these totally non-European languages, where they got their names for the days of the week, how their naturalists approach the scientific naming of birds, and, of course, the nature of the scripts the three languages are written in. The journey will give you glimpses of history, a close-up of the workings of culture, and the thrill of discovering the unexpected.

While the article on the comparative history of the names of the days of the week in these three languages, as well as Europe, is particularly fascinating the real attraction of the site is the massive archive of Harry Potter translation comparisons between Japanese, Vietnamese, and both mainland Chinese AND Taiwanese editions. While naturally of the most interest for fans of the series who are also familiar with one or more of the CJV languages, anyone interested in translation or comparative linguistics will also be fascinated by analysis of the translations of puns, character names, spell names, animals, and dialogue into each of these four editions.

Kokaryo- a 40 year old thorn in China / Japan / Taiwan relations

One week ago, The Asahi Shimbun reported on the latest development in a 40 year old court case that leaves Japan’s supreme court in the touchy position of having to abjudicate a dispute between The People’s Republic of China and Taiwan/The Republic of China over which government is the proper owner of a decrepit student dormitory located near Kyoto University, know as Kokaryo(光華寮).

For some of the basic facts of the case, here are some quotes from the Asahi article:

Located near Kyoto University in a quiet residential area, the five-story Kokaryo dormitory has a total floor space of about 2,000 square meters. A few students still reside there.

Kyoto University rented out the building from a private company during World War II and used it as a dormitory for Chinese students.

After the end of the war, the Republic of China purchased the dorm and left the students living there to manage it. Taiwan purchased the structure in 1952 to allow it to be used as a dorm for foreign students as before. This came after Mao Tse-tung established the People’s Republic of China in 1949.

In 1967, the Taiwanese government filed a lawsuit in the Kyoto District Court seeking to have students who supported the Chinese Communist Party in Beijing removed from the building.

The situation became even more complicated after 1972, the year Japan and China re-established diplomatic ties. At the same time, Japan broke off diplomatic relations with Taiwan.

In 1977, the Kyoto District Court ruled against Taiwan, but a 1982 Osaka High Court ruling overturned the lower court decision and sent the case back to the district court.

In 1986, the Kyoto District Court ruled in favor of Taiwan, and the Osaka High Court backed that ruling in 1987.

Beijing heatedly protested the court ruling, arguing that it recognized two Chinas in opposition to the official Japanese government stance that Beijing is the sole, legitimate representative of China.

The case then went to the Supreme Court, but for two decades it took no action because of possible diplomatic implications.

On Tuesday, it was learned that the Third Petty Bench of the Supreme Court had sent letters to lawyers for the two sides involved in the lawsuit seeking their opinion on which government held the right to represent China.

The lawsuit was originally filed with Taiwan as the plaintiff. If the Supreme Court eventually rules that China should become the plaintiff as the successor government, Taiwan would have no choice but to allow Beijing to continue with the case.

At one point, the dormitory lawsuit became a major diplomatic issue between Japan and China that was taken up during meetings of leaders of the two nations.

The late Deng Xiaoping criticized the Japanese court rulings supporting Taiwan.

Japanese government officials were forced to seek Beijing’s understanding that under Japan’s constitutional separation of powers, the administrative branch could not interfere with decisions made by the judicial branch.

The Supreme Court’s apparent decision to dust off the case could point to a new focus on legal issues.

Until the second Osaka High Court ruling, the focus had been whether the communist government set up in Beijing should be allowed to assume ownership of overseas assets.

According to a history of Kyoto University, the Kokaryo was first provided by Kyoto University in May of 1945 for the use of foreign students born in the Republic of China and the South Pacific islands that were in Japan to receive “special education.” Interestingly, it does not say “China”(中国） or “overseas Chinese” (華僑) , but quite specifically “Republic of China.” (中華民国) Of course, this is not an original document showing the intent of the university at the time they first rented the dormitory, but there may be something to it. Certainly there were many Taiwanese students in Japan at the time, but Taiwan was still Japanese and not Republic of China territory. Were there many ROC citizens studying in Japan before the end of WWII? Were there also PRC students at the time? This architecture page says that the building was constructed in 1931, and was originally an apartment building, presumably private, intended for Kyoto University students, and also gives a more detailed location, Sakyo-ku, Kitashirakawa,

According to this Yomiuri story, the legal battle started when Taiwan attempted to evict 8 students due to “trouble related to the management of the dormitory,” who then filed a lawsuit protesting the eviction, but the reason that Taiwan actually decided to throw out the students at this time is not indicated in any Japanese or English language articles that I found. However, according an article I found in the Liberty Times, (a Taiwanese newspaper well known for its pro-independence stance) the Chinese students were originally kicked out of the dorm in response to complaints by dorm-resident Taiwanese students, who were annoyed by shouts of “Banzai Chairman Mao!” from Chinese students in the grip of Cultural Revolution fever.

The PRC consulate in Fukuoka web page has a page outlining the official PRC government version of the story. Interestingly, this appears to be a direct translation of a Chinese page that I had originally read on the website of CCTV, where it is part of a September 2002 special on “30 Years of Normalized China-Japan Relations.”Aside from giving me a handy way to check how well I understood the Chinese page (I would say I got a passing grade, but not an A), the fact that a consulate general web page has exactly the same text as CCTV (China Central Television) is a strong reminder that CCTV is in fact an official government mouthpiece, and not a government sponsored but editorially independent media organization, like the BBC or NHK are supposed to be.

At least one possibly critical detail was left out of all Japanese and Taiwanese reporting on the case that I found, but can be found in Chinese language articles PRC side, as well as the aforementioned Japanese text of the Chinese consulate web site. Since the basis of the conflict is over which government has rights to overseas property of China, but since Kokaryo was not actually purchased by the ROC government until AFTER they had fled to Taiwan and the People’s Republic had been officially established, why is it even under contention? That is, the PRC is contending that overseas property owned by China before the PRC officially became China’s successor state should be transferred to their control. OK, fine- even if you accept that argument, why should they gain control of something that was purchased by the de-facto independent government on Taiwan? (Note that China does not seem to be attempting to harm Taiwanese property rights in general, perhaps because that would be too threatening to the massive Taiwanese investment in China.) The answer seems to be, at least according to China, because the Kokaryo was purchased by Taiwan’s representative in Japan using money received from the sale of property that had been seized by the Japan military’s invasion of China during WW2. I don’t have enough information to be entirely clear, but this seems to imply that while Taiwan may have the rights to property held or controlled by Taiwan before the establishment of the PRC, since the resources used to purchase Kokaryo were originally stolen from China, they must also be returned to China, which the ROC government on Taiwan was longer the legal representative of at that time. I have not yet found a second, independent, source for this information, or in fact for the Taiwanese account of the Chinese students’ eviction. Interestingly, and unsurprisingly, there are essential facts reported by the media of both sides that are not reported by anyone else, making it very difficult to uncover the reality without doing a significant amount of independent research.

Expect translations (more like paraphrase in the case of Chinese sources) of articles from both the Chinese and Taiwanese perspective.

Gendai on Abe’s chances of survival: “Abe government destined to die like a dog”

Tell it, Gendai (in translation from their daily e-mail):

Prime minister Abe keeps on protecting Health Minister Hakuo Yanagizawa despite calls within the ruling coalition for him to quit over his “women are birth-giving machines” statement. If Abe fires him, his own responsibility for appointing him will be called into question, and his shoddy hiring practices will suck even more momentum from the administration. With the Abe government in such a state, the LDP-Komeito coalition won’t be able to campaign for the unified local elections in 2 months, let alone the upper house election this summer. Right now the future state of affairs has become murky as to whether he’ll be dragged out early or fall dead of disease. Looking back at previous LDP administrations, all governments that faced severe criticism have died young. This cabinet even even worse than the Uno cabinet, which came under fire for a sex scandal, or the worst-in-history Mori, who made the “nation of gods” statement. Most everyone is thinking Abe’s government will die an early death as well.

Sankei gets slammed! over Supreme Court lay juror promotion scandal — why not Dentsu, too?

A scandal in which two newspapers (Sankei Shimbun and Chiba Nippo) paid temp workers and Sankei-affiliated deliverypersons to attend events promoting the new lay judge system to be introduced from 2009 has inspired this latest use of my favorite journalistic cliche:

Court slams payments to public forum attendees
Kyodo NewsTwo newspaper publishers acted inappropriately when they paid participants to take part in public forums intended to popularize the lay judge system, the Supreme Court said Monday.

The Osaka headquarters of the Sankei Shimbun and Chiba Nippo, a local newspaper in Chiba Prefecture, have acknowledged paying 3,000 yen to 5,000 yen to some participants at the events, which they cosponsored with the top court.

The court announced that it learned of the situation from a “journalistic institution” on Jan 26 and began investigations henceforth. I wonder which institution of fine journalism earned the privilege of ratting out its competitor? At least one blogger has noted that Asahi’s reporting reads “as if they were taking advantage of the situation“, but I won’t point any fingers myself.

Kibashiri Nikki reminds us that the last bit of fakery took place earlier this month, right after Sankei was extremely critical of the Abe administration for its handling of the faked town meeting scandal just last month.

But it is worth noting that Sankei and Chiba Nippo may not be the only ones who deserve to get slammed:

According to contract documents obtained by The Asahi Shimbun under the information disclosure system this month, the Supreme Court placed an order with advertising giant Dentsu Inc. to hold such forums at 50 locations across Japan from 2005 through 2006.

Dentsu said in its project proposal that the forums could be made known to readers of newspapers with a combined circulation of about 19 million.

So it paid local newspaper publishers to secure the sites for the forums and for other expenses. Each newspaper advertised the forums.

The newspapers are taking the blame for this, and if they were the ones making the payments that’s their responsibility. But isn’t it quite a coincidence that we’re seeing Dentsu involved once again in promoting government policy through so-called “public forums.” You may remember that Dentsu was the main contractor managing the scandalous “faked town meetings” a few months ago. In both cases Dentsu’s clients have been slammed for mobilizing “sakura” (slang for decoy participants) to make the forums look like more of a success. The general sequence of events is the same in both the town meeting scandals and this incident: Govt contracts to Dentsu > Dentsu places responsibility for the project to someone else (local government officials and the newspapers, respectively) > that someone else gets in trouble for poisoning the well. It must be nice for Dentsu to be able to keep its profits and its reputation of being the far-and-away top promotion company in Japan, such that even the government seems content to rely on them.

The Homeku blog sums up the situation well:

If you’re wondering why the newspaper company went that far to support the promotions, it’s because a feature story on the details of the meeting was printed the day after the forum, along with an advertisement for the Supreme Court’s lay judge system.

I think the real story is something like they got overeager in their desire for ad revenue. And anyway, we are talking about that newspaper company. They seem to have a weak sense of mission and ethics as an institution of journalism.

At last night’s press conference it was explained that both companies [Sankei and Chiba Nippo] bore the costs of paying the sakura. But that is inaccurate. These “Nationwide Forums on the Lay Judge System” were contracted out by the Supreme Court to Dentsu (Again?!) and Dentsu paid local newspapers the costs to manage them. Accordingly, the source of the money paid to the sakura was originally from the Supreme Court, in other words it was paid from tax revenues.

Another thing that bothers me is that there seems to be a problem with the Supreme Court spending money to promote the lay judge system. It seems like this deviates from the Supreme Court’s role.

The sequence of events in both the lay judge forums and the town meetings cases is that the government used tax revenue to have Dentsu promote the govt’s own policies to the public. It might be easy to understand if you consider that these scandals occur because the motives are impure.

NK Defector Dresnok on 60 Minutes

Watch the video here to see an interview with the “last living American defector in North Korea,” Joe Dresnok. It’s quite a thing to see. Some reactions:

Who are these filmmakers and why are they OK with making documentaries that are flattering to North Korea?
I can’t believe this guy. While he denies it, Dresnok is the guy fellow defector Jenkins, who now resides in Japan with his wife the former NK kidnapping vicim, described as having beat him mercilessly when they were living together. And somehow he’s proud of his life, in which he’s been a drunk, violent man who was bred with another white person specifically to train spies (his son wants to be a “diplomat”? Sure…) and exploited as a propaganda tool. Maybe as someone who caught few breaks in life (and has no real family ties to the US) this is comparably a better lifestyle. But it’s impossible for me to feel any sympathy for a man who, when confronted with a question about why he was fed while millions of North Koreans perished of famine, cries tears of gratitude for his rulers rather than shame. I mean, the announcer has a point that the NK defectors thought more about where they were running from rather than where they were running to, but at least Jenkins has some perspective on this issue.
I’m not sure why 60 Minutes left out the detail that the defectors were paired up with women to try and breed them and produce spies. Maybe it would have been rude to Dresnok’s son?
Those propaganda radios have got to be annoying as hell. I wonder if they have a special battery-generator system in place to keep them going during blackouts.

You can also watch the July 2006 interview with Jenkins here.

No more Dennis Hasterts for Japan, says Komori

Washington-based Sankei Shimbun veteran Yoshihisa Komori’s blog has gained some attention since its inception for two major incidents:

A column of his lashing out at a government-funded research institute that was producing “anti-Japan” scholarship, which eventually led to its closure. The move was documented and condemned by Washington Japan policy wonk Steve Clemons in a Washington Post Op-ed calling Komori a member of Japan’s emerging right-wing “thought police.”
Komori’s criticism of pro-China left-wing Japanologist Gregory Clark of Akita International University sparked a flame war between Clark and Komori’s readers. In response, Clark complained in the Japan Times of ideological harassment.

It may be true that Komori has used his position to put pressure on the left, but the claims made by Clemons that he is “not unaware that his words frequently animate [violent right-wing extremists],” however, seem to carry little water (at least based on the one example of Komori’s involvement in the aforementioned incident). At any rate, regardless of where you stand on Komori, it cannot be denied that the man is an experienced journalist with deep knowledge and insight, especially on issues of US-Japan relations.

It is with that in mind that I recommend his recent article (an excerpt from an article in December issue of monthly magazine SAPIO) from Jan 16 on the changes the new Congress will have in store in terms of individual members’/party stances toward Japan. Essentially, he rebukes the idea popular among some Japanese watchers of the US-Japan relationship that a Democratic Congress would suddenly turn hostile to Japan. No, he argues, the US Congress’ attitude toward Japan is far more complicated:

First of all, dividing American Congress members as “pro-Japan” or “anti-Japan” invites some misunderstanding. The word “anti-Japan” implies a perception that is somewhat removed from the reality of American politics. To put it bluntly, pro-Japan people do not exist in the US Congress and administration. To be pro-Japan means to have positive feelings for Japan or to like Japan.

The idea of a pro-Japan Congressperson would make one think of a politician who makes political statements and actions based on his affection or positive feelings toward Japan. Unfortunately, however, there are no such Congresspeople in the US Congress. It would disqualify them as US Congresspeople to change their legislative activities just because they like Japan.

[There are also people who are pro-Japan on the surface only because they think that the US-Japan alliance is in the US national interest. At the same time, there are “Japan experts” or those who have either lived, studied abroad in, or studied about Japan. These people have deep knowledge and understanding of Japan, but just because they know about Japan it doesn’t mean they are pro-Japan]

While emphasizing the above points, I have noticed that the biggest reason it seems like the “pro-Japan faction” in the new US Congress has declined is because Dennis Hastert (R, Ohio), former Speaker of the House since 1998, has stepped down. Hastert has experience living and teaching English in Osaka in the 1970s, and ever since he has often shown his closeness with Japan. For example, in 2003 when the “Families Association” including Sakie Yokota whose kin was kidnapped by North Korea visited Washington, it is well-known that Speaker Hastert greeted them in Japanese, saying “Yoku irasshaimashita” (Welcome!)

It is a fact that Hastert placed emphasis on Japan as Speaker in the process of holding deliberations on bills and hearings, and maintained a stance of firmly maintaining the alliance with Japan. For Hastert to go from Speaker to a regular representative perhaps means a loss in the power to place emphasis on Japan.

However, there are quite a few Congresspeople who value the relationship with Japan in both chambers. The reason there are so many in the Republican Party is probably because the Republican Bush Administration has taken the policy of emphasizing Japan. Rep. Senator Sam Brownback, too, has expressed sympathy and understanding of Japan for year, particularly with regard to the abduction issue. He has taken the utmost consideration of Japan’s humanitarian anguish with his efforts in holding hearings and press conferences. Brownback emphasizes all aspects of the US-Japan relationship and always speaks of Japan using positive expressions. He has shown interest in running in the 2008 presidential election.

Conservative Republican politicians such as Hastert and Brownback all place great importance on the US-Japan alliance. Similarly, another man who has made clear his stance to value Japan due to the importance of maintaining the US-Japan alliance is Rep. Sen. John McCain. He is the front-runner candidate for the Republican nomination in the 2008 presidential election.

The Democracts also have a near consensus in terms of maintaining the US-Japan alliance. One politician who knows Japan well and often talks about Japan is Dem. Sen Jay Rockefeller (WV, [who studied abroad at International Christian University in Tokyo for 3 years]). He often criticized Japan over the bilateral trade problems throughout the 1980s, but he has been consistent in espousing the alliance with Japan in terms of security.

Komori notes at the end that it’s not that simple to read the US Congress in simple pro or anti Japan terms. And anyway, it doesn’t matter that much anymore because the relationship has stabilized. There are no more major trade concerns, and anyway there is no way Japan can get a spot on the agenda with China getting everyone’s attention, not to mention the whole host of other foreign policy issues. While Congresspeople from either party might take an anti-Japan stance when jobs in their home districts are threatened, or the Democrats might go anti-Japan to please labor, these are not life or death concerns in the grand scheme of the relationship. Of course, worsened security situation in Asia or the unlikely prospect of a Nixon Shock-style financial crisis could make the US-Japan issue relevant and sexy again, I wouldn’t count on it.

Komori’s point seems to be one that I heard often when I was in Washington: Japan has little to worry about from losing “Japan hands” in high offices (such as when Mike Green stepped down as NSC adviser on Asian affairs in 2005). Perhaps in the rest of the article he makes this explicit. But I have to wonder about these reassurances: Japan has been relying more on the familiar Washington lobbyists recently as opposed to the traditional “Japan lobby,” but didn’t Hastert’s stance toward Japan come in handy when a Japan-backed lobbyist quelched a resolution condemning Japan’s supposed lack of reflection over WW2 atrocities? And isn’t it easier for people like the Washington-based Komori to do their own lobbying (say, brokering meetings between the Families Association and Hastert or helping hold hearings on an issue that has near-zilch to do with the US national interest) when the lobbied have warm feelings toward Japan already? Perhaps the lesson to be learned from the new Congress is that Japan shouldn’t count on seeing many “pro-Japan” Congresspeople from now on since people just aren’t paying that much attention to Japan issues right now. Whether that’s good or bad for Japan is somewhat besides the point.

Ministry of Health releases marriage stats

Japan’s ministry of Health, Labor, and Welfare have released their 2006 report on marriage statistics in Japan. While the headlines are reporting that now 25% of marriages are 2nd marriages (or 2nd and thereafter), I saw some more interesting highlights:

The number of marriages continues to fall, from 720,000 in 2004 to around 714,000 in 2005. This is down from a peak of 941,000 in 1975.
Divorces were down to 260,000 from a peak in 2002.
The average marriage age continues to rise (Men: 31, Women: 29)
The ratio of international marriages to total marriages jumped once again from 5% in 2004 to 6% in 2005.
Japanese men and women who marry outside their nationality continue to marry a distinctly different set of foreigners. In 1995, most internationally marrying Japanese men (35%) took Filipina brides, while a quarter of them married Chinese women. In 2005, the tables were turned, with only 30% marrying Filipinas and 35% marrying Chinese.
As for the international women, 18% of them (the 2nd largest group) marry American men, a statistic that has remained stable since 1995. However, the largest group in 1995 at 41% (Koreans, including Japanese-born “zainichi”) shrunk to 24% and was supplanted by 2005 by “Other countries” at 32.7%. What to make of this striking diversification? Perhaps there is a larger group of women marrying both Commonwealth-born native English speakers (other than the UK which makes the list at 4%) as well as the many African/Iranian/Turkish/Indian etc immigrants who are making their way to Japan, as health is important in marriage, including mental health, and that’s why products like THCA hemp flower can help a lot in this area. Or perhaps it is simply an indication of the “diaspora” of Japanese women that the Western media has reported. No explanation is given in the report, unfortunately, nor was there a breakdown of what these mysterious “other countries” might be (other countries that made the list were China, Peru, Brazil, the Philippines, and Thailand).
Also, the ratio of Japanese men marrying foreign women:Japanese women marrying foreign men has increased from about 3:1 in 1995 to 4:1 in 2005, evidence that may speak of an even more noticeable “diaspora” effect among men. Nevertheless, the growing number of international marriages could indeed be caused by the palpable divide between the sexes.
Marriages tend to peak during months in which members of the imperial family get married, as well as in months that share the same number as the year (example: Feb 2002 =2/02). Cute.

I was looking for a statistic comparable to the famous “2/3 of all US marriages end in divorce,” but I couldn’t find anything like that. Ah well, chew on that for a while!

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