The Tortured Japanese Decision Making Process, Part 1: Dubai and Futenma

UPDATE: When I read the blog on my Etisalat-serviced Blackberry over the weekend, I was horrified to see that the text of this post was substantially abridged to just three paragraphs and slightly edited for flow to remove all references to Dubai (excluding the title). When I finally got to a computer today, I see that it appears unedited, even on my Dubai computer. I remain perplexed as to what would be deemed critical of the UAE in this post that could have been material subject to censorship. –Curzon, 13 December.

I haven’t yet publicly explained to MF readers, but I recently relocated my permanent residence from Tokyo to Dubai. I’ve since been publishing most of my thoughts on my new life in the region at ComingAnarchy.com, a more appropriate forum for the material, and you can read dispatches from the region in recent posts that appeared here, here, here and here. However, I am still remain closely involved in Japan, and will continue to blog here on topics that relate to Japan and Asia. I am also on a flexibly but ultimately fixed term assignment in the Middle East and plan to return to Japan afterwards.

A move between civilizations such as this clearly reveals contrasts between cultures. From the mere provision of services, to the exotic types of food, to the very manner in which human beings interract, many things are different. I could list dozens of example, but it’s primarily the quirky differences that stick in my mind. For example, did you know that the number of bathrooms in apartments and houses in the Middle East is the number of bedrooms, plus one? Apparently Arabs are loathe to share bathrooms, even with family members, so every 2LDK has three bathrooms (the additional bathroom is for guests) and one 3LDK with a maid’s room I saw during my house hunt had five bathrooms! There are also similarities between the two cultures when viewed from the Western perspective — Arabs, like the Japanese, are polite and formal when first meeting, prefer their commercial transactions to be relationship-oriented, and don’t allow their women equal social participation.

One stark contrast with regards to culture that sticks in my mind is the decision-making process. I’ve become accustomed to the concensus-based approach to making decisions in Japan, to the extent that Japan’s norms are natural to me — take time to hear all opinions, discuss pros and cons, think some more, and then eventually wander towards a decision. This works fine in Japan, but it’s completely different in most of the rest of the world, and in the Middle East, I’ve seen some important decisions made at the drop of a hat. What’s more, when I need to decide things that involve other people, I see the Japanese decision-making process reflected in myself, and I would observe that it has the power to drive people crazy. “Make a decision already! Or get back to me when you’re finished!” That’s something I’ve heard several times in both the personal and commercial context over the past few weeks.

The Japanese decision-making process works great in Japan, and is an important part of the culture, but it simply doesn’t work overseas, where decisions are, by comparison, streamlined. This is something that the Japanese must understand if they engage non-Japanese parties in discussions or negotiations, and many major trading companies with global operations and bureaucratic institutions of government have carefully internalized their decision making procedures so as not to send mixed messages. It still takes them a long time to come to a decision, but at least it helps to prevent them appearing indecisive, weak, or send out mixed messages.

I have been thinking about this for the past few days and just this morning read that Obama is avoiding a private chat on the Futenma Base relocation with Hatoyama at the Copenhagan environmental summit. (Regular readers know that I was very critical of the DPJ scattershot approach to foreign policy before they took power, and specifically addressed the absurd and painful procedure used to review the Futenma Base relocation in previous blog posts.) When queried on this, the White House press secretary answered that the two leader met two months ago and nothing has changed since. Therefore…

Therefore what? The Japanese logic concludes that, therefore, all levels of America’s foreign policy and defense apparatus should continue to join in with the decision-making process. The Western logic is just the reverse — the natural conclusion is that there is nothing further to discuss, as what needs to happen now is for Japan to come to a decision and then tell America their decision.

Or as I’ve heard a few times since coming to Dubai: “Make a decision already! Or get back to me when you’re finished!” That Hatoyama is trying to involve Obama in the nemawashi process in the Futenma Base relocation is yet another example of how the DPJ are rank amateurs. During the LDP years, administrations were at least good at holding off American officials while the internal decision making process went forward, and thus avoided public disagreements, sending mixed messages, or appear not to have a clue. The DPJ needs to realize that the consensus-based decision making process is unique to Japan and does not work internationally. Taking such a long time to come to a conclusion is painful enough for most non-Japanese to tolerate, and becoming pulled into the decision making process is bound to end badly. When will Hatoyama realize this, and what damage will be done to the US-Japan alliance in the interim?

30 thoughts on “The Tortured Japanese Decision Making Process, Part 1: Dubai and Futenma”

  1. Thanks for writing this, Curzon. I have a draft kicking around in the MFT cutting room called “The perils of ringisho worship.” Here’s a little passage from it.

    In any Japanese company, every decision has to be written up in a ringisho (稟議書) and physically signed or sealed by multiple relevant parties. This process is essentially there to make sure that nothing happens unless everyone in the food chain agrees. This is especially important in listed companies and in heavily regulated industries like finance, where numerous third parties are likely to review the approval history surrounding a questionable transaction or line of business.

    Many organizational inefficiencies thus continue due to the strive for personal efficiency, i.e. laziness. Even if a problem has a simple and elegant solution, the procedures necessary to put that solution into effect can often make it seem more efficient to simply let the inefficiency continue.

    This is especially acute in Japanese organizations for a couple of reasons. One is that every executive has grown up with the ringisho concept in the forefront of their mind. There is so little lateral movement between key organizations that most executives know nothing but their own bureaucracy, and they get used to living in the mindset that their organization is about as steerable as a cow.

    Another key factor is that career back-office folks, the ones literally pushing papers around, have developed all of their skills within the framework of this approval system and would have to be replaced or retrained (kicking and screaming all the way) if it changed.

    But as the situation continues, even small organizations wind up in the mindset that decision-making by consensus is a best practice necessary in any cohesive organization. I learned a while ago that one can only defeat this system by nagging your organizational contact so persistently that they finally give up and break the rules (or come up with an exception) just to get you to go away.

    This is also a persistent problem in government, both within the bureaucracy and within the elected ranks of the Diet. I don’t believe that hereditary politicians are the core problem. Instead, the problem seems to be that everyone gets into the ringisho mode here, and wants to get collective sign-off on their decision (whether from their department or from their party faction) before putting it into action.

    I think we are saying the same thing, but I take a more visual approach to it while you take a more conceptual approach to it.

    That said, I wonder how deep the “culture” of indecision really runs. I get the impression that it is a relatively recent phenomenon in Japanese society, perhaps dating back only to the Meiji era or even to World War II, as some sort of natural antithesis to rule by samurai/the military. But I really don’t know, and it would be a fascinating question to tackle as a historian.

  2. I work in a larger international Japanese corporation.

    I find that a lot of quite crucial technical and design decisions are made without any reference to people outside Japan, which often results in serious defects in the products/services when they are transferred to a non-Japanese setting.

  3. I don’t think the process is entirely unique to Japan. Granted, I haven’t worked in a Japanese company or a Scandinavian company, but I think in Scandinavia there is a similar consensus based decision process.

  4. If you look at Japanese history, you can find both extremely decisive unilateral leaders (Nobunaga) and geniuses at building consensus (Ieyasu). There really isn’t a Japanese culture of decision making that exists independently of historical circumstances. I don’t think that there was an antithesis to samurai rule that developed in the modern period – Edo period decision making was in the hands of (hereditary) junior and senior elders – committees essentially. One of Japan’s advantages in modernization was that it already had a Weberian bureaucratic tradition.

    In the pre-war period, we do see decisive decisions – Manchurian incident (let’s just do it and let the government sort it out after), groups of young officers getting together to assassinate PMs, things that you can’t imagine at present. If I had to posit a very tentative thesis about the origin of the business culture that you see at present, I would put its roots in the 1950s and 1960s where business was influenced very strongly by “government suggestion” and compromise between government, bureaucracy, and business leaders was the name of the game. That, and the end of the “start up” generation – people like Honda and Matsushita were considered to be strong and decisive leaders but after the 1970s, they were replaced by a consensus-style apparatus after Japanese, as a whole, became less “hungry”. When hungry characters like Horie come along, they tend not to care much about consensus.

    Outside of business, there is still lots of consensus, but you also see plenty of examples of the most senior dude just doing whatever he wants.

    Also, should we really be talking about Obama in terms of these cultural contrasts at this point? He took months to decide that he is going to simultaneously increase and end the American presence in Afghanistan, compromising with everyone, pleasing no one.

  5. I agree with M-Bone, and you can see the changes in foreign policy and political decision-making as well. From time to time, rather than attempting to acheive consensus, Yoshida would actually stir up trouble in order to get what he wanted. Sato occasionally made deals with the Americans without trying to build consensus at home. Sometimes these failed (textiles) only to be implemented later when the key ministries (MITI) came on board. Sometimes he jut made decisions in secret without telling anyone but those closest to him (the Okinawa reversion secrets, nuclear planning for Japan).

    By the mid-1970s, you see a recognition of a need for consensus, with Miki slowly guiding things like the restriction on defence spending to 1% of GNP and the “peacetime” orientation of the SDF through an arduous process to gain political and popular support. Of course, Miki was responding to JDA Director Nakasone’s attempts to bolster military preparedness.

    And no one can tell me Nakasone or Koizumi sought consensus. Still, while they will be remembered for their bombast, I’m not so sure they achieved what they set out to do.

  6. There are certainly charismatic individuals out there in Japan, but their underlying organizations remain powered by consensus. I suppose the extreme difficulty of firing employees/bureaucrats is part (if not much) of the cause, although it may actually be an effect….

  7. If I were a US Defense Department official, I would be annoyed that the DPJ seems to want to repeat the same conversation that took more than a decade to resolve. I think Obama recognizes that there is a lot of confusion within the new coalition about what to do (from what I understand, Okada wants a quick settlement largely on America’s terms, Fukushima seems to be actively encouraging a rift in US-Japan relations, and no one knows what the hell Hatoyama thinks), so avoiding a meeting with Hatoyama might be a way for Obama and the US to stay out of the fray until they know what the Japanese actually want. Importantly, wouldn’t Obama meeting Hatoyama send a signal that the two agree? Considering that Hatoyama is leaning against the US position that wouldn’t make much sense. At the same time, screaming yourself hoarse (as Ambassador Roos has taken to doing) also seems counterproductive.

    The DPJ coalition does appear to be adopting a “Japanese-style” consensus building approach, but this is what the circumstances require. With ministers in the same government so bitterly divided and with each seeming to have effective veto power (thanks to a relatively weak PM), how else could they proceed without breaking up the government? If Ozawa were PM, we might not be having this problem.

    When I say Hatoyama is weak, I don’t necessarily mean he’s a wimp. It’s just that he was more or less swept to power on the house that Ozawa built, not through much of his own accomplishment. Therefore his mandate seems to be diminished. It also doesn’t help that his softer approach keeps getting spat on by hardasses like Kamei.

    Another difference is this debate is playing out with much more vehement and public disagreement than the LDP and the bureaucratic establishment would have permitted. Frankly I am OK with that despite the confusion as it a) means decisions won’t be based on how to extract the biggest kickbacks from defense contractors, and b) this might be the only way to force a real “renegotiation” of the defense agreement as it forces the US to live up to the formal status of their forces as invited by the Japanese government.

    If I were Hatoyama, I would do all I can to push this issue back under the radar until after July, when the DPJ may pick up enough seats for Hatoyama to claim a more credible leadership position and (most importantly) to boot out the SDP from the coalition. Then they can move forward with the real plan of a more modest renegotiation. The risk to this strategy would be that the DPJ has stirred the pot so much that a resolution can’t be put off.

  8. Adamu wrote: “…July, when the DPJ may pick up enough seats for Hatoyama to claim a more credible leadership position and (most importantly) to boot out the SDP from the coalition.”

    The assumption behind the above, frequently heard bit of advice, is that Hatoyama and Ozawa really don’t like being allied with the SDP and that they will dump them at the earliest opportunity. Time will tell, but my sense is that this is a mistaken assumption. Hatoyama in particular is closer in his own views to the SDP than to his right flank. His close ally Hirano has also recently stated that the solution to Futenma must involve a reduced impact on Okinawa. I think when the dust settles, Hatoyama is going to propose a solution that the SDP can live with, and then try to get the US to accept it. It may include the transfer of US forces to some other part of Japan, or possibly out of Japan altogether.

  9. My fervent hope is DPJ wins enough upper house seats to boot both SDP and Kokumin Shinto from the coalition.

  10. Curzon, how come it doesn’t drive you crazy? When did you get accustomed to it? I’ve been in decision making positions here but I don’t think it’ll ever stop driving me crazy.

  11. I agree with Wataru.

    1)Pentagon made deal with Tokyo in the 90’s.But that was LDP led Tokyo.And this is now.

    2)If DPJ backs down now,there will be huge division within the party,especially those who belonged to former SDP.They may want to make the DPJ more fraction oriented party like DPJ before their share of power become smaller after July.

    3)Hatoyama demanded “Alliance without garrison” in the past.So this is his issue,not the one being enforced by SPD.

  12. >But that was LDP led Tokyo.And this is now.‘

    Quite right. And the circumstances under which that deal was closed would only make the DPJ more grouchy about the entire deal. It was a treaty-like instrument “ratified” by Japan, but not by the United States, which puts obligations on the former, but none on the latter. The Pentagon, for example, has no obligation whatsoever to account for the $330 million the Japanese have handed over to it to pay for Marine relocation to Guam. The deal was also “ratified” by an obviously outgoing government mere months before the DPJ came to power, despite the long negotiation period.

    Given the manifesto non-promises, I think Hatoyama had every intention of just letting this linger for a while, which would have been the sensible thing to do. Let the Okinawans get used to the idea that perhaps the Henoko deal has to go through,even under the DPJ. It is the American side which forced the issue. With a new government in Tokyo likely to stick around for a while, that was probably not a smart thing to do. I think there are some in the U.S. who want to see this issue split the DPJ or lead to its downfall. That would only lead to a more paralytic Japan.

  13. >They may want to make the DPJ more fraction oriented party

    I don’t think that will work. Factions existed partly because the LDP had to run against itself in multi-member districts under the old system to secure a majority. In other words, there was an incentive to strike different positions to members in the same party. Now there isn’t, and disunity will actually hurt parties whether factions exist or not.

    What the DPJ really needed to do was hammer out a common position on foreign policy before the election. What both parties need to do is find a set of principles to represent, and politely shift those people who can’t stomach those principles on. That’s why I have a grudging respect for people like Asao, who figured out where he stood and gravitated toward the party that most reflected his position–although there was the lure of an HoR seat hovering around that decision as well.

    The factions lingered after the change in the electoral system because of certain institutional factors. Also, there was no real threat to LDP power for the better part of a decade after electoral change, while the DPJ emerged. I don’t think factions can have much relevance anymore.

  14. I heard some rumours about communist China but
    it must be a really hard time for them.

    The rumour?
    Imperial attestation by the Japanese Emperor will be prerequisite to take the chair
    of the Chinese Head of state.

    Well, that is what I heard. hehe

    So then, is China going to be an underling of Japan?
    Not to mention but Korean president was born in Japan too.

    What is up with Japan? Do those asian countries think they need to be
    authorized by the Japanese Emperor?
    At least it seems like China has.

  15. Also, I see now from the Yomiuri that the US side has offered Japan a little deal sweetener in the form of an “environmental clause” if Japan goes ahead and implements the original plan. This is a promise to take more responsibility for environmental messes they make on bases. But this is a clause the Koreans and Germans already have, and one Japan has long been asking for but which up to now the US has refused to give. From the Japanese side, it must look pretty pathetic coming at this stage.

  16. I have no idea where you heard such a rumor, but I can assure you that it is complete nonsense. Even the Prime Minister of Japan doesn’t need permission from the Emperor, and you can safely assume that China would make full use of their military before agreeing to any condition like that. I assume you remember what happened last time Japan tried to control China?

  17. I’m pretty sure Xi Jinping won’t bow to the emperor like Obama, hah.
    Guess the commies just enjoy being able to force the Japanese government to break establish procedures and get the emperor to meet a vice-president in China’s terms.
    And anyway all the complaining about it is pretty stupid. The emperor is and always has been a puppet of the government. Now its even officially so.

  18. ”disunity will actually hurt parties whether factions exist or not.”

    Exactly.But we have precedent which had just done that.The Socialist Party of Japan.

    “What the DPJ really needed to do was hammer out a common position on foreign policy before the election.”

    But then,that was impossible.Even LDP had never done that.
    Ozawa knew that would break up the party just like the security debate broke the coalition way back in 1994.

    Faction would probably mean a lot for DPJ from now on,especially Ozawa wants to be the king maker in the party and there are those who oppose that.

  19. Some theories far more likely to be true than China one above – Obama not an American, 911 Truth, Hitler alive, Charlemagne descended from Jesus, Japan exploded an A-bomb.

    Come to think of it, Mao’s brain in a vat pulling the strings behind the scenes is far more likely than the above scenario.

    Under what circumstances could it possibly be true?

    Cao Cao was found encased in a block of ice by a joint collaborationist Chinese / Japanese excavation team in inner Tibet in 1939. He immediately led Communist Chinese forces in a string of victories against Japan that have been erased from the historical record. Cao Cao forged a secret alliance with Yoshitsune (who just happens to be around with no explanation). Realizing that victory against “the West” was impossible, both men set up a 100 year plan to rule the world. Akihito was replaced by Cao Cao’s son while Yoshitsune is in stasis in a base under Mt. Fuji. Japan’s role is to manipulate the US into inaction while China builds up its military power. Meanwhile, Japan is entering into the last phase of its plan to design bipedal robots powered by 5th generation organic computers. Can Palin’s multi-ethnic team of American ninjas stop the yellow peril?

  20. I think this is a bit out of Golgo’s league. Palin will have to go to Iscandar on the Enterprise.

  21. “Consensus” is often a bit of a misnomer when describing a Japanese decision-making process. A lot of hanko stamps may be needed to approve a project but not all inputs are equal. Just as elsewhere in the world, you can usually find a few influential people, who know how to work the system to their advantage, behind a lot of decisions. You can also see examples of dictator-types across a whole range of organizations, not just owner-controlled enterprises.

    As far as foreign businesses are concerned, there was a sweet spot between around 1998 and 2003 when you could cold call a Japanese company with a proposal and make remarkable headway without the jumping through the usual hoops which characterized interaction in previous years. That was a short-lived window, however.

    During the bubble, you could also get some fast decisions if you were dealing with the overseas subsidiaries of Japanese companies. Certainly, there were standing jokes about always having to “wait from the fax from Tokyo” (or telex, in an earlier era) but a lot of managers had considerable funds and discretion in those heady days, especially if they were setting up an office. In recent years, mobile phones and the internet mean that Head Office has exponentially more opportunities to micromanage overseas executives so you won’t find so many people willing or able to shoot from the hip.

  22. She could, of course, just be selected as a vice-presidential candidate. That would be just as nuts.

  23. UPDATE INSERTED. FYI, the post as it reads on my Blackberry is:

    I haven’t yet publicly explained to MF readers, but I recently relocated my permanent residence from Tokyo to Dubai. I’ve since been publishing most of my thoughts on my new life in the region at ComingAnarchy.com, a more appropriate forum for the material, and you can read dispatches from the region in recent posts that appeared here, here, here and here. However, I am still remain closely involved in Japan, and will continue to blog here on topics that relate to Japan and Asia. I am also on a flexibly but ultimately fixed term assignment in the Middle East and plan to return to Japan afterwards.

    I’ve been thinking about the Japanese decision-making process laterly. It works great in Japan, and is an important part of the culture, but it simply doesn’t work overseas, where decisions are, by comparison, streamlined. This is something that the Japanese must understand if they engage non-Japanese parties in discussions or negotiations, and many major trading companies with global operations and bureaucratic institutions of government have carefully internalized their decision making procedures so as not to send mixed messages. It still takes them a long time to come to a decision, but at least it helps to prevent them appearing indecisive, weak, or send out mixed messages.

    I have been thinking about this for the past few days and just this morning read that Obama is avoiding a private chat on the Futenma Base relocation with Hatoyama at the Copenhagan environmental summit. (Regular readers know that I was very critical of the DPJ scattershot approach to foreign policy before they took power, and specifically addressed the absurd and painful procedure used to review the Futenma Base relocation in previous blog posts.) When queried on this, the White House press secretary answered that the two leader met two months ago and nothing has changed since. Therefore…

    Therefore what? The Japanese logic concludes that, therefore, all levels of America’s foreign policy and defense apparatus should continue to join in with the decision-making process. The Western logic is just the reverse—the natural conclusion is that there is nothing further to discuss, as what needs to happen now is for Japan to come to a decision and then tell America their decision. When will Hatoyama realize this, and what damage will be done to the US-Japan alliance in the interim?

  24. Curzon – I remember seeing all of the Dubai stuff in your post last week. Please let us know what is up when you figure it all out.

    “You can also see examples of dictator-types across a whole range of organizations, not just owner-controlled enterprises.”

    Indeed. It strikes me that we hear most about the “one man” style when it fails.

    ”She could, of course, just be selected as a vice-presidential candidate. That would be just as nuts.”

    She’s actually president in my story. Nixon’s brain in a vat is running things from behind the scenes, however.

  25. Are Henry Kissinger and Chou-En-lai’s-brain-in-a-vat conducting shuttle diplomacy behind the scenes? And will the enterprise that Palin takes to Iscandar be owner-controlled?

  26. So many of you are whacked! I think the DPJ’s original gambit was to see what they could get out of America, since we previously showed ourselves to be fat, affable fools who are easily bribed.

    I think Hatoyama and his buddy Ozawa were taken aback that America was not interested in re-negotiation.

    Especially you Japan-side expats, and those with time in: how many fair contracts have you actually had the Japanese keep? They only keep the ones where they received a disproportionate advantage.

    It has nothing to do with rin gi sho. This was more “let’s see what extra we can go squeeze out of Fat Ass, as always . . . “

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