http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/04/opinion/04iht-edkissinger.html?pagewanted=1&_r=1

>In any case, I don’t think that Japanese public opinion will shift toward constitutional revision in the near future, let alone getting nuclear arms.

I agree. But the admission of the exercise of the right to collective self-defense may be approaching.

http://rockhand.cocolog-nifty.com/blog/2009/06/the-h.html

Of course. And that argument has amazing traction…. in Japan. Abroad? Only with people who are already pro-disarmament.

In any case, I don’t think that Japanese public opinion will shift toward constitutional revision in the near future, let alone getting nuclear arms.

I think the typical Japanese response to that would be “being the only country to have ever been attacked with a nuclear weapon is all the authority we need.”

And I understand that you aren’t advocating Japan taking up nukes just for bargaining purposes, but I can imagine someone actually following that argument to its logical conclusion.

Roy – Don’t mean that Japan should get nukes just for the voice, rather that Japanese, as a non-nuclear power, have to understand that they are in a very different position in disarmament discussions and find a way to speak with authority despite this.

“M-Bone’s observation of the Japanese left seems to apply to Japan’s neighbors, right, wrong or indifferent.”

It does apply. When you apply these types of culturalist positions to yourself, however, you can be described as reflective and self-critical (shouldn’t to too far, however). When you apply them to someone else’s culture, you end up demonizing.

Interestingly, it looks like these documents accidentally released by the US Government indicate that the US will be submitting to inspection by the IAEA for the first time.

Assuming Japan has the recipe and ingredients at the ready to embark upon building a deliverable nuclear weapon post haste, the measures don’t stop at topping an ICBM with a warhead and bombs away. Extensive testing of both the delivery method and the fissile hell to be delivered will have to be performed to produce a viable weapon. So far as I know, there remains no covert fashion in which to test a nuclear device nor a long range missile. It stands to reason that Japan’s intentions will be quickly discerned by it’s neighbors and the reaction won’t be favorable. Very likely China’s reaction will be to immediately change it’s diplomatic position regarding North Korea as it’s ailing, regional “problem child” to that of strategic military asset. Beyond North Korea and China how does a nuclear armed Japan sit with South Korea?

M-Bone states:
“The Japanese left has relied too much on the idea that “Japanese were evil during the war so Japanese can turn evil at any time so should not have nukes.”

Remember Koizumi’s visits to the Yasukuni shrine and the jingoistic reaction they incurred in China and South Korea? Or the reaction to Koizumi’s proposed changes to the constitution to allow Japanese troops to engage in military action? M-Bone’s observation of the Japanese left seems to apply to Japan’s neighbors, right, wrong or indifferent.

If Japan choses to go nuclear it should be in the interest of becoming a 21st century military power (and one hopes Japan is ready to spend the extraordinary amount of yen it will cost; beyond production lies infrastructure, security, considerable military measures to defend nuke sites, first strike contingencies, reactive measure contingencies, a well designed political heirarchy of control regarding nukes, etc.) and not simply to mitigate the threat of North Korea.

Yes, but it recognises and defines “nuclear-weapons States” as parties to the treaty, but does not define non-nuclear-weapon States at all, which may lead to two separate conclusions.

Firstly, your conclusion that “non-nuclear-weapon States” include all states that are not “nuclear-weapons States” as defined by the treaty, i.e., those that did not explode a bomb before 1967.

or

As the term “non-nuclear-weapon States” is undefined by the NPT, it therefore may only apply to those that signed up to the treaty. After all, it makes absolutely no sense to impose obligations on “non-nuclear weapons States” (as the NPT does) if those states are not party to the agreement. As India, Pakistan and Israel didn’t sign, they have no status as either nuclear-weapon States or non-nuclear-weapon States according to the treaty. They have no status as such.

I disagree.China had already made peace with nuclear nemesis.Russia and India.
If they can’t with Japan,then that has nothing to do with nukes but the old wounds of the past.Something that will continue to haunt the bilateral relation with or without Japanese nuclear armament.
NK integration into somekind of reasonable regional order is even vague.First NK must collapse with it’s tyranny.Second they(or unified Korea)must abandon nuke.And three,this is something I don’t believe coming while I’m alive but what exactly is a reasonable regional order here?

“Nukes could significantly decrease Japan’s security and I think that other possibilities should be exhausted before going down that road.”

But that’s not the way many(if not the most)nuclear states think.Why Japan would be the exception?

“It may be a second rate “factory of the world” in 10 years while Japan surges. There could be a real move toward political liberalization. China could be counter-balanced by an Indo-Japanese defence pact.”

“Second rate” it maybe,still the largest.Anyway,no one in Asia can counter China alone.That’s a fact.And I don’t think Japan surges in 10 years.

Indo-Japanese defense pact is unlikely.Indians were not that crazy about Abe Shinzo’s”The quads”.Worried that might upset Beijing and may lose policy independence to Washington.And India won’t be an East Asian power,but China is.And China is a power in South Asia that can only counter India,or so see the regional members in the sub-continent.India as a international player is over-rated.

Well,Taiwan has a state.Republic of China,that is.But it’s not being recoginzied by everyone.

“In an abstract game-theory way it does make a kind of sense, but as an actual negotiation tactic it sounds kind of schizophrenic, particularly if nuclear disarmament is the real goal.”

But the nuclear disarmament itself is quasi-schizophrenic in practice….