Here’s a Japanese explanation of the FOIA system:
http://www.soumu.go.jp/gyoukan/kanri/jyohokokai/gaiyo.html

But the worry I hear from some people is that he’s too young and unlike the savvy “seikyoku no Koizumi” he’ll be even more beholden to the interest groups (izokukai etc) he’s been courting.

Also, what I think we’re seeing in Abe’s “pre-emptive attack” “getting the ability to and other supposedly hawkish statements is less like fantasizing about invasion but more like posturing between Japan, Korea, NK, and China, much like the Yasukuni visits. It’s a dangerous chess game to be sure, because once Abe makes such a statement he puts the ball in NK/China’s court and they could do something that could force Japan’s hand to avoid losing face.

Marxy – Not sure what the catalyst was for Horie’s arrest. It’s certainly true that some of the offences look remarkably similar to regular practices at other firms so it might look as if Horie was targeted specifically while others are ignored. On the other hand, given the range of indictments in the recent past, it is possible that these practices won’t be acceptable in the future and Horie was a high-profile catch in a broader crackdown. Recruit Chairman Hiromasa Ezoe wasn’t the only one rigging IPOs for his friends back in 1986 either but he was the one arrested. In fact, Japan’s justice system, where an arrest still leads to a guilty verdict in a high proportion of cases, now appears more successful at prosecuting financial market crimes than the US or the UK which is an odd turn of events.

Also, you make a good point about Abe having no domestic policy ideas, but will he not be the most aggressively right-wing PM Japan has had in ages? Nakasone said some dumb things, but Abe seems to be daydreaming of a full-fledged invasion of NK.

Mulboyne – Basically, I think Murphy is wrong about his claim that economic reforms are mere window dressing – this is a flaw that reminds me of van Wolferen (no such thing as a Japanese government, every policy is an abortive “nonpolicy”). As your examples show, there is most certainly a host of policy challenges facing Japan, and the debate over which path to follow is often waged between ministries rather than in the Diet or among public interest groups. Sure, Japan has no intention of rocking the international financial system, but that doesn’t let Japan off the hook for finding ways to stay competitive and fight stagnation in the runup to its demographic crunch, for starters. Things like removing government employee status from 260k postal workers aren’t horse and pony shows for Washington – they have real consequences that, handled badly, could spell doom for the ruling party and the bureaucratic stranglehold on power in general.

For one thing, the GOJ is much more transparent than it’s ever been. Major developments include the advent of FOIA requests and public comment procedures. Also, during the Koizumi years a wealth of government stats/white papers have become available for free online. These developments give private groups and opposition leaders more tools with which to force transparency from the government. Of course, the first two were basically pushed through by the US, but who’s counting?

And sure, Koizumi hasn’t kept the bureaucrats at bay (what happened to the LDP think tank?) My old boss comlpained that his inauguration speech in 2001 was mostly written by kanryo. But I would argue that in the case of CEFP, the election system, etc Koizumi simply used the tools that were made available to him by his predecessors and made them work.

Good point about the FSA - it’s interesting to see them work to position themselves as Japan’s SEC, which is, I believe, a worthy thing to aspire to. Not only that, in any government – and perhaps especially so in Japan – it’s imperative to maintain public confidence in the financial system. Even though the MOF is recognized as a relic of the war era, it’s still got an essential role to play.